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Differences in the value judgments made in measuring inequality underlie the 
conflicting factual claims often heard about how much poor people have shared 
in the economic gains from globalization.  Opponents in the debate differ in: (i) 
whether they weight people or countries equally in assessing the extent of 
inequality; (ii) the weight they give to vertical inequalities versus horizontal 
inequalities and (iii) the extent to which they care about relative inequality versus 
absolute inequality. The value judgments on these issues made by both sides need 
greater scrutiny if the globalization debate is to move forward.  
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How much are the world’s poor sharing in the gains from the economic growth fueled by 
greater economic integration?  There are seemingly conflicting answers from the two sides of the 
ongoing debate on globalization and inequality.  On one side, the website of a prominent NGO in 
the anti-globalization movement, the International Forum on Globalization, confidently claims 
that “globalization policies have … increased inequality between and within nations.”
1   This 
stands in marked contrast to the claims made by those more favorable to globalization; for 
example, an article in The Economist magazine states with equal confidence that: “Globalization 
raises incomes, and the poor participate fully” (The Economist, May 27, 2000, p.94).        
Why do such different views persist?  Surely the evidence would be conclusive one way 
or the other?  I have heard it claimed by a prominent advocate for one side of this debate that the 
other side is simply “ignorant of the facts.”  But surely the facts would be clear enough by now?   
It must be acknowledged that the available data on poverty and inequality are far from 
ideal, though neither side of this debate has paid much attention to the data problems.
2  There are 
also potentially important differences in the types of data used.  The “pro-globalization” side has 
tended to prefer “hard” quantitative data while the other side has drawn more eclectically on 
various types of evidence, both systematic and anecdotal or subjective.  Differences in the data 
used no doubt account in part for the differing positions taken.  However, since both sides have 
had access to essentially the same data, it does not seem plausible that such large and persistent 
differences in the claims made about what is happening to inequality in the world stem entirely 
from one side’s “ignorance of the facts.” 
                                                 
1   See http://www.ifg.org/store.htm. Similarly, the Policy Director of Oxfam writes that: “There is 
plenty of evidence that current patterns of growth and globalization are widening income disparities” 
(Letter to The Economist, June 20, 2000, p.6). 
2   For a fuller discussion of the data and measurement issues underlying the globalization debate see 
Ravallion (2003).    3
One reason why such different views persist is that it is difficult to separate out the 
effects of globalization from the many other factors impinging on how the distribution of income 
is evolving in the world.  The processes of global economic integration are so pervasive that it is 
hard to say what the world would be like without them.
3  These difficulties of attribution provide 
ample fuel for debate, though they also leave one suspicious of the confident claims made by 
both sides. 
Conflicting assessments can also stem from hidden contextual factors.  Diverse impacts 
of the same growth-promoting policies on inequality can be expected given the differences 
between countries in initial conditions.  Policy reforms shift the distribution of income in 
different directions in different countries.  Yet both sides make generalizations about 
distributional impacts without specifying the context.  In a given country setting, there may well 
be much less to disagree about.      
This paper looks into another possible reason for the continuing debate about the facts: 
the two sides in this debate do not share the same values about what constitutes a just distribution 
of the gains from globalization.  The empirical facts in contention do not stem solely from 
objective data on incomes, prices and so on, but also depend on value judgments made in 
measurement — judgments that one may or may not accept.  It can hardly be surprising that 
different people hold different normative views about inequality.  And it is well understood in 
economics that those views carry weight for how one defines and measures inequality, though 
recognizing that it is ethics not economics that determines what trade-offs one accepts between 
the welfare of different people. An important class of “ethical measures” of inequality are built 
                                                 
3   Basu (2003, p.898) put is nicely: “In reality, globalization is a bit like gravity.  We may discuss 
endlessly whether it is good or bad but the question of not having it does not seriously arise.”    4
on this realization.
4  What is more notable in the present context is that important differences in 
values have become embedded in the methodological details underlying statements about what is 
happening to inequality in the world.
5  The differences are rarely brought to the surface and 
argued out properly in this debate.
6    
The paper points to three differences in the value judgments made about distributive 
justice underlying the globalization debate.  The first concerns one of the favorite empirical 
claims of the critics of globalization, namely that inequality between countries has been rising in 
the period of globalization — suggesting that the gains have been unfairly distributed.  The pro-
globalization side disputes this, arguing instead that inequality between countries has been 
falling over the last 20 years or so.  The value judgment here relates to whether one should 
weight countries equally or people equally when assessing distributional outcomes.   
The second difference in concepts of inequality relates to how much weight one should 
attach to the way average gains from reform vary with income, versus the differences in impacts 
found at a given level of income.  The pro-globalization side has tended to focus on aggregate 
measures of inequality or poverty, while the anti-globalization side has pointed to the losers 
amongst the poor and those vulnerable to poverty, thought often to the point of ignoring the 
aggregate outcomes.  A value judgment underlying this difference in perspective relates to the 
weight one attaches to horizontal versus vertical inequality when assessing distributional impacts 
of globalization.  
                                                 
4   A seminal early contribution was made by Atkinson (1970).  For an excellent survey of 
approaches to the measurement of inequality see Cowell (2000). 
5   This is not an isolated instance of the blurring of facts and values; for further discussion see 
Putnam (2002).   
6   More generally, economists have been reticent to debate values, preferring to focus on “facts.”  
This has led some observers to argue that modern economics has become divorced from ethics, though 
that is a questionable characterization, as Dasgupta (2003) argues forcefully.     5
The third issue concerns another distinction between two concepts of inequality; one is 
relative inequality, which depends solely on proportionate differences in incomes, while the 
other is absolute inequality, which depends on the absolute differences  — the “income gap 
between rich and poor.”  Virtually all the research by economists on world inequality has used 
the former concept, which has then become embedded in more popular writings supporting 
globalization.  By contrast, critics of globalization appear often to be more concerned with 
absolute inequality.  Here again we will see that the difference in concepts of inequality carries 
weight for the position one takes in the globalization debate. 
 
Some stylized “facts” 
A common finding in the literature is that changes over time in the extent if income 
inequality at country level are uncorrelated with rates of economic growth.  In other words, 
growth is “distribution neutral” on average.
7  Figure 1 illustrates this lack of correlation found 
between changes in inequality and growth in average living standards.  Each point in the figure 
represents two household surveys at different dates for the same country and the figure gives 
about 120 such “spells” spanning the 1990s.
 8  The change in inequality between the two surveys 
is plotted against the growth rate in mean household income (or consumption) per person 
between the same two surveys.  Inequality is measured by the usual Gini index.  The simple 
correlation coefficient between changes in the Gini index and the growth rates in Figure 1 is -
0.06.  Among growing economies, inequality rises about half the time, and falls half the time.  
This also holds for growing poor countries.  Thus these data confirm other studies suggesting 
that the Kuznets Hypothesis — the proposition that with growth in a low-income country, 
                                                 
7   Evidence on this point can be found in, inter alia, World Bank (1990, 2000), Ravallion and Chen 
(1997), Ravallion (2001) and Dollar and Kraay (2002). 
8   This is an updated version of the data set described in Ravallion and Chen (1997).   6
inequality first increases then starts to fall after a certain point — has generally not been borne 
out by experience in growing developing countries (Bruno et al., 1998; Fields, 2001). 
  The observation that changes in inequality tend to be uncorrelated with growth rates has 
an important implication.  Since growth tends to leave income shares unchanged on average, 
absolute poverty measures (whereby the poverty line has fixed real value) will tend to fall with 
growth.  The same share of a larger pie means of course a higher income.  The expected negative 
correlation between rates of poverty reduction and rates of growth across countries has been 
borne out by a large body of empirical research using household-level survey data for many 
countries.
9   Granted there have been cases in which growth has left the poor behind in absolute 
terms, but they are the exception rather than the rule.   
Is the world becoming more unequal in the current period of globalization?  Measuring 
inequality amongst people in the world as a whole, different studies and different time periods 
give different answers to this question. Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) finds signs of slightly 
rising inequality from the 1970s to the early 1990s.  Sala-i-Martin (2002) reports evidence 
suggesting a tendency for inequality to fall in the 1990s.  Milanovic (2004) reports rising 
inequality in some sub-periods and falling inequality in others, with no clear trend.   
However, even if one takes the view that inequality has been rising, it has clearly not 
increased enough to choke off the gains to the poor from growth in the world economy.  Figure 2 
gives estimates of the poverty rate for the developing world over the period 1981-2001.  Over 
this 20 year period, the percentage of the population of the developing world living below $1 per 
day was almost halved, falling from 40% to 21%.   The number of poor by this measure fell from 
1.5 billion in 1981 to 1.1 billion in 2001.  
                                                 
9   Evidence on this point can be found in World Bank (1990, 2000), Ravallion (1995, 2001), 
Ravallion and Chen (1997), and Fields (2001).   7
  Some of these “stylized facts” about what has been happening to poverty and inequality 
in the world have been questioned.  The claims often heard from critics of globalization that the 
world is becoming more unequal appear to stem in part from the fact that many poor countries 
are not participated in the growth of the world economy.  Indeed, looking back over the last 100 
years or so, initially poorer countries have tended to experience lower subsequent growth rates 
(Pritchett, 1997).  Poor countries are not catching up with rich ones — indeed, it looks like the 
opposite has been happening.  For example, an often quoted statistic is that the average income 
of the richest country in the world was about 10 times that of the poorest around the end of the 
nineteenth century but is closer to 60 times higher today.  Furthermore, on top of this long run 
trend, there have been claims that inequality between countries has increased sharply since about 
1980 (Milanovic, 2004).  (We will return to the issue of how inequality between countries should 
be measured.) 
Another issue that has sometimes been raised concerns the fact that the above discussion 
relates only to absolute poverty, whereby the poverty line has fixed real value.  Measures of 
“relative poverty” in which the poverty line responds positively to the mean naturally show less 
impact of growth.  Indeed, in the extreme case in which the poverty line is directly proportional 
to the mean, a growth process that raises all incomes by an equal proportion will leave measured 
poverty unchanged.  One can question whether such a poverty measure makes any sense; while 
relative deprivation may matter to welfare, it surely cannot be argued that absolute levels of 
living are irrelevant. When one compares poverty lines across countries with their average 
consumption levels one finds higher poverty lines in richer countries, though the relationship 
tends to be quite inelastic amongst poor countries, consistent with the view that absolute 
deprivation dominates (Ravallion, 1994).  However, as developing countries grow, the ides of   8
what “poverty” means will undoubtedly evolve too.  Then a sole focus on absolute poverty will 
overstate the importance of growth to poverty reduction in the longer-term.  
The pro-globalization side of the debate has often pointed to the developing world’s 
overall success against absolute poverty since the early 1980s as support for the view that 
globalization is good for poverty reduction.  It is argued that pro-globalization policies in 
developing countries are pro-poor because they generate higher economic growth, which does 
not come with higher inequality and so reduces absolute poverty (see, for example, World Bank, 
2002).  However, a closer inspection of the aggregate poverty numbers, such as in Figure 2, 
immediately raises some doubts about the role played by globalization versus other factors.  
China is hugely important in the world’s overall success against extreme poverty; indeed, the 
number of poor in the world (by the $1 a day standard) outside China has remains quite stable 
over this period, at around 850 million (Chen and Ravallion, 2004b).   As is clear from Figure 2, 
there was a dramatic decline in China’s poverty incidence in the early 1980s; about 200 million 
people crossed the $1 per day hurdle between 1981 and 1984.  Note, however, that this largely 
preceded the country’s external trade reforms (Chen and Ravallion, 2004c).   More plausibly the 
sharp drop in poverty in China in the early 1980s was due to another kind of reform: the de-
collectivization of agriculture following Premier Deng’s reforms starting in 1978.   
Furthermore, while the evidence is compelling that growth tends to reduce absolute 
poverty, that does not imply that every policy that is good for growth will also reduce poverty.  
Specific growth-promoting policies in specific country contexts can have impacts on distribution 
that belie such generalizations.  For example, Lundberg and Squire (2003) find evidence that 
trade openness tends to be inequality increasing.  There is also some evidence of an interaction   9
effect with mean income, such that trade openness tend to be associated with higher  inequality 
in poor countries, but lower inequality in high-income countries (Barro, 2000; Ravallion, 2001). 
The above issues have received attention in the literature, though all of them are 
sufficiently important and sufficiently contentious to merit further research.  The rest of this 
paper will examine some issues that have received far less attention, related to what we mean by 
“inequality.” It will be argued that differences between competing concepts of inequality 
influence the way empirical evidence is interpreted and hence the position one takes in the 
globalization debate.      
 
Divergence vs. between-country inequality 
Critics of globalization have pointed to data suggesting that inequality between countries 
has been rising since around 1980.  The contribution of globalization per se to this trend is 
unclear.
10  However, putting the attribution problem to one side, there is another important 
question about how inequality should be measured.  The measures most widely quoted by the 
critics of globalization treat each country as one observation.  The implicit value judgment here 
is that countries, not people, should get equal weight in assessing the fairness of the division of 
the gains from globalization.  An alternative approach is to give people equal weight.  Estimates 
of the decomposition of world inequality into between-country and within-country components 
have typically used population weights.
11  By this alternative concept, all individuals at a given 
real income level get equal weight in assessing between-country inequality, no matter where they 
live.  A person in China does not count less than a person in Chad at the same real income. 
                                                 
10   For further discussion see Williamson (1998) and O’Rourke (2002).  
11   See, for example, Schultz (1998), Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002) 
For an overview of the theory of inequality decomposition see Cowell (2000).   10
The choice between these concepts of inequality matters greatly to the message conveyed 
on how fairly the benefits of aggregate growth are being shared.  If instead of weighting 
countries equally one uses population weights then the tendency for rising inequality between 
countries vanishes.
12  Indeed, with population weighting, there is evidence of a trend decline in 
the between-country component of inequality since roughly the mid-1970s.  In marked contrast 
to the series in which countries are weighted equally, the population-weighted series in Figure 3 
suggests that inequality between countries is now the lowest it has been in half a century.  The 
difference in the message conveyed by the two weighting schemes could hardly be less dramatic. 
What arguments can be made for choosing between the two series in Figure 3? Some 
economists have seen this as a purely technical matter of what is “right” and “wrong.”
  For 
example, Sala-i-Martin has argued that weighting countries equally is a “mistake that delivers a 
very misleading picture and one is led to conclude (wrongly) that there has been ‘divergence big 
time’” (Sala-i-Martin, 2002, p.25-26; in the last phrase he quotes the title of Pritchett, 1997).   
However, intelligent people can disagree about whether countries or people should be weighted 
equally.  Consider the inequality between two equal-sized groups, A and B, in which each person 
in group A has an income of $1 per day while each person in B has an income of $10.  (So we 
abstract from inter-group inequality.)  Now imagine instead that group B is only one tenth the 
size of A.  Is your assessment of the extent of inequality between A and B any different with this 
change?  No doubt some readers will say “no” on the grounds that either way a typical person in 
group A has only one tenth of the income as one in B.  Others will say “yes,” on the grounds that 
                                                 
12   There have been a number of recent estimates of the time series of global inequality, including 
Schultz (1998), Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), Sala-i-Martin (2002) and Milanovic (2004).  The 
latter study is the most comprehensive in terms of the coverage of the underlying distributional data and 
so the following discussion will draw mainly on that study’s results.    11
with fewer people in group B, one’s concern about the extent of inter-group inequality is 
diminished. 
When assessing how rich countries are doing relative to poor countries it is natural to 
take the country as the unit of observation.  Knowing that the income per capita of a rich country 
is 30 times greater (even at purchasing power parity) than a poor country has a salience for our 
comprehension of the extent of the disparities in the world.  The practice of weighting countries 
equally is almost universally followed in the large macroeconomic literature on growth and 
distributional empirics.  Weighting countries equally is a close cousin of the method used to 
measure “sigma convergence” in the literature on growth empirics.  The rise in between-country 
inequality over the last 20 years that is evident in Figure 3 when countries are weighted equally 
is indicative of what is called (un-conditional) divergence in the growth literature. Weighting 
countries equally makes sense in a regression that is being used to test theories about the causes 
of cross-country differences in growth rates (say).  In that case, each country can be thought of as 
a draw from the universe of all the combinations of country policies, shocks, initial conditions 
and outcomes.   
It has been argued that countries are the relevant unit of observation for comparing 
policies, and for drawing conclusions about what policies work best for reducing inequality 
between countries. Milanovic (2004) makes this argument in favor of weighting countries 
equally.  This view is more defensible for certain economy-wide policies than others, such as 
social sector policies, which are often developed and implemented at sub-national (even local) 
levels.  However, for the sake of argument let us agree that policies are implemented at country 
level.  Is this a compelling argument for weighting countries equally when assessing global 
inequality?  It is the impacts of those policies on people that we care about.  The lack of policy   12
reform and growth in a small country surely cannot be deemed to cancel out the policy reforms 
that helped generate so much economic growth in China over the last 20 years or so.  Yet that is 
what un-weighted inequality measures do.  While it can be agreed that for purely descriptive 
purposes, and for testing the implications of certain growth models, one may not care about the 
population shares of countries when assessing inequality between them, weighting people 
unequally in such a seemingly arbitrary way can be questioned when — as is plainly the case in 
the globalization debate — one is attaching normative significance to measures of between-
country inequality. 
The practice of weighting countries equally when measuring inequality between-
countries also implies troubling inconsistencies in methodology.  It is not clear why one would 
be happy to use population weights when measuring inequality within countries, but not between 
them.  Indeed, one would probably never question the need to weight by household size (or the 
number of adult equivalents) when calculating an inequality measure from a sample survey for a 
given country, and the same logic surely applies to the between-country component of total 
inequality. Weighting countries equally rather than people is also inconsistent with the way one 
would normally calculate the global mean income.  A measure of inequality is a summary 
statistic of the information on how income is found to vary with the quantile (such as percentile) 
of the population ranked by income.  One would probably not even think of using the un-
weighted overall mean income, so why would one use un-weighted means at given percentiles of 
the distribution when measuring inequality?   
Another defense of weighting countries equally starts by rejecting the implicit 
assumption in population weighting that individual welfare depends on “own income,” and 
allowing instead the possibility instead that welfare also depends on country of residence.    13
Population weights can be questioned in all circumstances in which group memberships have 
welfare significance independently of incomes.  This can happen in a variety of ways.  For 
example, the local political jurisdiction of residence can matter to one’s access to local public 
goods.  Group membership can also matter to one’s ability to insure against income risk or 
smooth consumption.  Social norms of behavior or “culture” are also formed in groups, and can 
influence welfare in important ways.
13  There are ample precedents for attaching significance to 
geographic identity in public policy.  The constitutions of a number of federations (including 
Australia and the U.S.) give states political representation in the upper houses of parliament, 
independently of their population sizes.  Those living in smaller states thus get higher weight.  
Similarly, it is “one country-one-vote” at the United Nations and many other international 
organizations.     
What is not so clear is how persuasive such arguments are for weighting countries 
equally rather than people in the present context.  Yes, one can allow that country identity 
matters.  However, it would seem hard to imagine that this type of argument would justify 
weighting countries equally.  That surely goes too far in the other direction.  Some sort of hybrid 
weighting scheme is called for, derived from an explicit assumption on the weight one attaches 
to country identity in assessing individual welfare.  Suppose that the role of “country identity” 
can be captured by a country-specific multiplicative factor on the underlying function of own 
income that one uses to assess individual welfare in a given country.  Then the appropriate 
weights will be products of population weights and these country-specific factors.  It would seem 
extremely unlikely that the appropriate country factors would be the inverse population shares.   
                                                 
13   For a model of economic behavior incorporating group identities see Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  
Kanbur (2003) questions individualism in the context of a critique of the policy significance often 
attached to inequality decompositions.   14
A further issue concerns the robustness of the population-weighted inequality series in 
Figure 3.  China and India (the two most populous countries by far) naturally play an important 
role in the striking difference between the two series in Figure 3.  The high rates of growth in 
China and (more recently) India since the mid-1980s have been a major inequality-reducing 
force between people in the world.  Take these countries out of the population-weighted series 
and the decline in between-country inequality over the last two decades or so largely vanishes; 
the result is particularly sensitive to just one country, China.
14  By the same token, assessments 
of how (population-weighted) inequality is changing between countries can be quite sensitive to 
errors in measuring growth in China and India.  For example, there are reasons to suspect biases 
in the long-run estimates of China’s rate of growth, stemming in part from deficiencies in the 
underlying administrative data sources, particularly at local level.  (The practice of setting 
obligatory growth rate targets for local governments has not helped!)  China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics has gone a long way toward correcting these problems, but it still appears likely that 
the long-run rate of growth in national income per capita has been overestimated by 1-2 
percentage points (Maddison, 1998; Wang and Meng, 2001).  The rate of decline in inequality 
evident in Figure 3 when people are weighted equally is almost certainly overstated.   
The sensitivity of the population-weighted series to including the most populous 
countries is not a good reason for weighting countries equally.  However, that sensitivity does 
speak to the need for statistical caution in inferring that inequality is falling between countries 
from the population weighted series in Figure 3.  How confident can one be in claiming that 
inequality is falling when that no longer holds if one drops just one country? 
                                                 
14   This has been noted by Schultz (1998), Sala-i-Martin (2002) and Milanovic (2004).   15
As we have seen, the implicit values in empirical work matter greatly to the assessment 
one is drawn to make about the distributive justice of current globalization processes.  And 
arguments can be made both ways.   
 
Vertical vs. horizontal inequalities 
The empirical question at stake in the globalization debate is often posed in terms of how 
mean gains from reforms vary by pre-reform income.  Do the mean proportionate gains rise or 
fall as income increases?  Studies deemed to be favorable to the supporters of globalization are 
those that find that the mean proportionate gains are just as high for the poor as the non-poor 
(see, for example, Dollar and Kraay, 2002).       
This perspective emphasizes what can bet termed the “vertical” impacts of reform, i.e., 
the differences in mean impacts between people at different income levels.  Critics of 
globalization, by contrast, appear often to be more concerned about what we can call the 
“horizontal” impacts, such as when anti-globalizers point to the fact that there are losers amongst 
the poor, even when the net gains to the poor as a whole are positive.  Borrowing from the 
literature on inequality and taxation, we can define the horizontal impacts as the differences in 
impact amongst people who are ex ante equal in terms of welfare; such impacts indicate 
horizontal inequality in the reform.
15   
A conventional poverty or inequality measure implicitly attaches weight to both 
horizontal and vertical inequality.  To see how, imagine that each person receives an income gain 
from the reform (which could be positive, negative or zero).  We can calculate a pre-reform 
poverty and inequality measure (based on the distribution of incomes excluding these gains) and 
                                                 
15   For further elaboration of the various concepts of horizontal inequality found in the literature see 
Jenkins and Lambert (1999).     16
a post-reform measure (including the gains).  The difference between the two reveals  the overall 
impact of the reform.  One can then decompose the impact of a policy reform into “vertical” and 
“horizontal” components as follows.  Define the conditional mean gain as the mean of these 
gains at a given level of income.  Imagine replacing each person’s actual gain by the conditional 
mean corresponding to that person’s income and calculating the impact on the poverty or 
inequality measure with this new synthetic distribution.  We can interpret this as the vertical 
component of the change in inequality or poverty.  If there are no differences in the impacts by 
levels of income then the vertical component is zero.  However, when some people amongst 
those at around the same initial income level incur a net loss from reform, while others enjoy a 
gain, this will add to inequality.  To isolate this horizontal component we can also replace each 
person’s actual gain by the deviation between that gain and the conditional mean, and again re-
calculate the summary statistic on this synthetic distribution.  If the impact is predicted perfectly 
by pre-reform income then this horizontal component is zero.
16  Ravallion and Lokshin (1994) 
derives such a decomposition for the impacts of trade reform on inequality and give and 
empirical example for a specific trade reform; I will return to this example below. 
The issue is not then whether horizontal inequality is reflected in current aggregate 
measures but whether it is adequately reflected.  Observers can reasonably object to the 
horizontal inequalities of globalizing reforms — quite independently of the impacts that those 
reforms have on conventional inequality or poverty measures.  One possible reason is that the 
initial distribution of income (as measured in practice) need not be horizontally equitable.  This 
can stem from the inadequacies of income as a welfare metric.  There are conceptual and 
                                                 
16   The vertical and horizontal components need not add up exactly to the total change in measured 
poverty or inequality.  A special case in which the decomposition is exact for proportionate gains 
(normalized by pre-reform income) is for the Mean Log Deviation measure of inequality; for details see 
Ravallion and Lokshin (2004).   17
practical problem in measuring household “income” or “consumption,” and in making cost-of-
living comparisons when prices and household characteristics vary (including the choice of the 
equivalence scales for dealing with differences in family size and demographics).
17  Nor are 
standard measures (such as household income per person) likely to  reflect well the extent of 
inequality within households or differences in access to non-market goods.  These concerns point 
to the importance of introducing supplementary indicators of welfare into distributional 
assessments (Ravallion, 1996).  If we think that certain types of households may in fact be poorer 
than measured incomes suggest then our attention will naturally be drawn to impacts on those 
household types, even if they have similar (measured) incomes.  Peoples’ subjective assessments 
of economic welfare and the fairness of the outcomes from economic transactions have been 
found to depend on a variety of factors, including how much effort different people supplied as 
well as their initial income.
18  Reference-group effects on welfare — whereby the same income 
can yield different welfare for people in different reference groups, such as different 
neighborhoods —can also imply a concern for differences in impacts amongst people at the same 
ex ante income. 
We can also care about horizontal inequalities even when we are happy with how 
economic welfare is measured.  In the economics of public policy there is precedent for concern 
over horizontal inequality, notably in the context of income tax changes — though the point 
would appear to apply with equal force to other types of policy reform. For example, Pigou 
(1949, p.50) wrote that horizontal inequality created “..a sense of being unfairly treated…in itself 
an evil.”  Auerbach and Hassett (2002, p.1117) argue that one might want to put higher weight 
                                                 
17   A good overview of the issues and literature on welfare measurement can be found in Slesnick 
(1998).  On the bearing that measurement choices can have on policy see Ravallion (1994). 
18   For a survey of experimental evidence relevant to this point see Konow (2003). Subjective 
assessments of economic welfare have also revealed a more complex set if factors than typically 
postulated by economists (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002).   18
on horizontal inequities in a tax system on the grounds that “..large differences [in tax rates] 
amongst similar individuals, regardless of their source, might be viewed as intrinsically arbitrary, 
and therefore more costly to the social fabric.”   
Two recent studies of tax and transfer policies have shown how inequality or poverty 
measures can be re-defined to give higher weight to horizontal inequality.  In the context of 
measuring the extent of horizontal inequality in a tax reform, Auerbach and Hassett show how an 
Atkinson (1970) index of social welfare can be decomposed into vertical and horizontal 
components in which the inequality aversion parameters can be different between the two.  In a 
similar vein, Bibi and Duclos (2004) allow differential weights on the horizontal versus vertical 
components of the impacts of targeted transfers on the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) measure 
of poverty.  The same ideas from the analysis of taxes and transfers carry weight in other areas of 
public policy including trade and other efficiency-oriented reforms.   
In the context of reform we may deem it to be unfair that people at similar initial incomes 
are rewarded very differently.  Such assessments will probably depend in part on whether people 
were aware of the risks they were exposed too, and could have taken actions to protect 
themselves. It is plain that many of the welfare losses from globalization stem from factors for 
which the losers are essentially blameless.  When the sole employer in a company town is driven 
out of business we can hardly blame the town’s workers and residents for the losses they incur.   
In the case of trade reform, the household characteristics that are likely to matter most to 
the horizontal welfare impacts are those that influence net trading positions in relevant markets.  
Whether a household is a net demander or a net supplier of the specific goods and factors whose 
prices are changed by trade reform will depend on (amongst other things) its assets (for example, 
how much land an farm household controls will influence whether it is a net producer or net   19
consumer of food), demographics (since this will naturally influence consumption patterns) and 
location (which will matter to both production and consumption opportunities).  There is no 
obvious basis for thinking that these are characteristics that stem from choices for which one 
would fairly ask the households themselves to bear the adverse consequences of reform.   
Such horizontal inequities can also interact powerfully with pre-existing social tensions 
— such as between different ethnic groups having different production and consumption 
behaviors — thus fuelling social conflict, and even violent conflict.  Chua (2003, Chapter 4) 
describes how social conflict in parts of Africa has stemmed from the fact that different tribal 
groups have (for various, and contested, reasons) fared very differently under market-friendly 
regimes.  To some extent these conflicts can be thought of as stemming from historical vertical 
inequalities between groups.  However, it can be conjectured that a large share is horizontal, in 
that ex-ante similar people in different groups fare very differently under the market-oriented 
reform. There is no reason to suppose that a conventional inequality measure would weight the 
consequent social conflicts appropriately.  Extreme horizontal inequalities raise concerns about 
social and political stability; the protests from the losers can be loud, even when the aggregate 
net gains are positive.     
Conventional measurement practices may well underweight horizontal inequality.  
Indeed, the measure will remain exactly the same if we simply reorder all the incomes in a 
society; this property is variously called the “anonymity axiom” or the “symmetry axiom” in the 
theory of poverty and inequality measurement.  Thus if a policy change results in one person 
loosing and another gaining, such that they swap places in the distribution, this will not have had 
any impact whatsoever on standard measures.  Yet this kind of “churning” in the distribution is   20
unlikely to go unnoticed by the people involved.  One should not be surprised if the losers in the 
process are unhappy about the outcome, and that this fuels criticisms of the policies that led to it. 
If we agree that these largely theoretical arguments suggest that the horizontal inequities 
of reform merit greater attention, the next question is whether horizontal inequalities are likely to 
be quantitatively important in the welfare outcomes of specific growth-promoting policy 
reforms, including trade reforms. We know from development experience that many of the 
things that promote growth can have both winners and losers among the poor, and for other 
income groups.  This arises from the heterogeneity in economic circumstances, such as 
differences in net trading positions in relevant markets for goods and factors.  For example, some 
of the poor are net suppliers of food while others are net demanders, which means that changes 
in the relative price of food associated with trade reform benefit some but hurt others, with these 
diverse impacts found both vertically and horizontally in the distribution of income.
19  There can 
be heterogeneity in other dimensions of welfare at given incomes, such as associated with 
differences in access to publicly provided goods and services.  Greater openness to external trade 
often increases the demand for skills that can be quite inequitably distributed in poor countries. 
Whether the poor gain relatively more than the non-poor from trade openness will depend 
crucially on antecedent inequalities in other dimensions, notably human capital. 
Two examples illustrate the heterogeneity in impacts of trade reform.  The first example 
relates to China’s recent accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  To provide a 
detailed picture of the welfare impacts of this trade reform, Chen and Ravallion (2004) use 
China’s national rural and urban household surveys to measure and explain the welfare impacts 
of goods and factor price changes attributed to accession to the WTO.  The price changes were 
                                                 
19   See, for example, the results of Ravallion and van de Walle (1991) on the welfare effects of 
higher rice prices in Indonesia.     21
estimated using a general equilibrium model to capture both direct and indirect effects of the 
initial tariff changes.  The welfare impacts were estimated as first-order approximations of a 
money metric of utility, based on a household model incorporating own-production activities, 
calibrated to the household-level data imposing minimum aggregation.  In the aggregate, Chen 
and Ravallion find a positive impact of WTO accession on mean household income, but virtually 
no change in aggregate inequality and slightly lower aggregate poverty in the short term as a 
result of the reform.
20  (The estimated impact on the Gini index for example was so small as to 
be almost undetectable.)  However, there is still a sizable, and at least partly explicable, variance 
in impacts across household characteristics at given income.  Rural families tend to lose; urban 
households tend to gain.  There are larger impacts in some parts of the country than others.  For 
example, one finds non-negligible welfare losses among agricultural households in the northeast 
— a region in which rural households are more dependent on feed grain production (for which 
falling relative prices are expected from WTO accession) than elsewhere in China.  Vertical 
differences in pre-intervention incomes accounted for virtually none of the measured welfare 
impact of this trade reform. 
The second example comes from research on the likely impacts of agricultural trade 
reform in Morocco.  Here the simulated trade reform entailed the de-protection of cereal 
producers, through substantial reductions in tariffs on imported cereals.  As in the China study, 
the price changes were estimated using a general equilibrium model and the welfare impacts 
were estimated as first-order approximations of a money metric of utility using a household 
survey; details can be found in Ravallion and Lokshin (2004).  In this case, the results suggested 
that the trade reform would increase overall consumption inequality in Morocco.  However, this 
was entirely due to the reform’s impact on horizontal inequality; indeed, the vertical component 
                                                 
20   The results are documented fully in Chen and Ravallion (2004).    22
— the contribution of the inequality in gains conditional on income — was inequality reducing.  
And, as in China, the horizontal welfare impacts are correlated with household demographics 
and location.   
  Simply averaging over such horizontal inequalities can miss a great deal of what matters 
to the debate on globalization, including social protection policies.  Credible assessments of the 
likely welfare impacts (both horizontally and vertically) can clearly hold implications for social 
protection (though it is probably little more than wishful thinking to imagine that full 
compensation is feasible, given the informational and incentive constraints on targeted 
policies.
21)  It is important for policy discussions to recognize that diverse welfare impacts can 
lie under the surface of average impact calculations.
22  In this light, claims made about the 
distributional impacts of trade or other reforms using cross-country regressions are of 
questionable relevance for policy in any specific country; such regressions can hide the 
heterogeneity in impacts within countries as well as between them.
23   
  Horizontal inequality is a long-established inequality concept in the literature on 
inequality measurement, though its is a concept that has received less attention than vertical 
inequality in theoretical work.
24  Measures of horizontal inequality have typically been applied to 
studying tax reforms, though the idea can be adapted to a wider range of reforms and economic 
changes.  (In the present context, the relevant horizontal inequalities are not confined to 
horizontal impacts that can be measured in monetary units.)  Like absolute inequality, horizontal 
                                                 
21   For a fuller discussion of this point see van de Walle (1998). 
22   Kanbur (2001) provides a nice illustration of this point in the context of assessments of Ghana’s 
performance in reducing absolute poverty.  
23   For further discussion of the concerns about cross-country regressions in this context see 
Ravallion (2001). 
24   For an overview of the theory and references see Jenkins and Lambert (1999).   23
inequality has so far taken a back seat in studies by economists related to inequality and 
globalization.   
None of this denies the importance of knowing the implications for aggregate poverty 
and inequality.  That is surely the first-order issue in this context.  Even when we care about 
horizontal inequity we would presumably want to balance that concern against other policy 
objectives, such as reducing absolute poverty.  If one follows the critics of globalization who 
focus solely on the losers among the poor then one risks derailing the prospects for important 
poverty-reducing policy changes.  At the same time, it must be recognized that to undervalue or 
even ignore the horizontal heterogeneity in impacts can give a seriously incomplete picture, and 
an unnecessarily narrow basis for policy.   
 
Relative inequality vs. absolute inequality 
So far we have been solely concerned with what is known as relative inequality in the 
literature on inequality measurement.  Relative inequality depends on the ratios of individual 
incomes to the mean.  If all incomes rise by the same proportion then relative inequality is 
unchanged.  The stylized fact that growth or greater openness in developing countries tends not 
to be systematically associated with rising (or falling) inequality rests on this specific concept of 
inequality.  
This contrasts with the concept of absolute inequality, which depends on the absolute 
differences in levels of living, rather than relative differences, following Kolm (1976).
25  A 
measure of absolute inequality is unchanged if all incomes increase by the same amount.  
Consider an economy with just two households with incomes: $1,000 and $10,000.  If both 
                                                 
25   There are also intermediate measures, which contain the concepts of absolute and relative 
inequality as extreme cases; see, for example, Bossert and Pfingsten (1990).     24
incomes double in size then relative inequality will remain the same; the richer household is still 
10 times richer.  But the absolute difference in their incomes has doubled, from $9,000 to 
$18,000.  Relative inequality is unchanged but absolute inequality has risen sharply.  
While relative inequality has been the preferred concept in empirical work in 
development economics, perceptions that “inequality is rising” may well relate more to absolute 
inequality.  That is one interpretation of what people mean when they talk about the “gap 
between the rich and the poor,” and the “widening economic divide” (International Forum on 
Globalization, 2002).  Observers such as citizens and NGO’s working in developing countries 
can easily see the rising absolute gap in living standards between selected poor people (possibly 
those an NGO works with) and selected “rich” people.  The fact that the proportionate gap may 
well be unchanged is less evident to the naked eye, if only because this requires knowledge of 
the overall mean.  Furthermore, there is little obvious reason for assuming that it is the relative 
inequalities in incomes (rather than absolute inequalities) that matter instrumentally to valued 
social outcomes.  Arguably inequalities in power relate more to absolute inequality of income 
than relative inequality.  Many people think about “inequality” in absolute terms.  Careful 
surveys of university students asked them which of two income distributions was more unequal; 
40% of the students were found to base their answers on a concept of absolute inequality, while 
for 60% it was relative inequality (Amiel and Cowell, 1999).     
Here again, the value judgments made about what “inequality” means have considerable 
bearing on the position one takes in the globalization debate.  Finding that the share of income 
going to the poor does not change on average with growth does not mean that “growth raises the 
incomes (of the poor) by about as much as it raises the incomes of everybody else” (The 
Economist, May 27, 2000, p.94).  Given existing inequality, the income gains to the rich from   25
distribution-neutral growth will of course be greater than the gains to the poor. In the above 
example of two households, the income gain from growth is 10 times greater for the high-income 
household.  To say that this means that the poor “share fully” in the gains from growth is clearly 
a stretch.  And the example is not far fetched.  For the richest decile in India, the income gain 
from distribution-neutral growth will be about four times higher than the gain to the poorest 
quintile; it will be 15-20 times higher in Brazil or South Africa.  
The common empirical finding in the literature that changes in relative inequality have 
virtually zero correlation with rates of economic growth naturally carries little weight for those 
who are concerned instead about absolute inequality.  In Figure 4 the relative inequality index in 
Figure 1 has been replaced by the absolute Gini index, based on absolute differences in incomes 
(not normalized by the mean).  In marked contrast to Figure 1, a strong positive correlation 
emerges (a correlation coefficient of 0.64).  The absolute gap between the rich and the poor tends 
to rise in growing economies, and fall in contracting ones.   
If you are a relativist then you might conclude from Figure 1 that there is no aggregate 
trade-off between economic growth and reducing inequality, though one should note that this is 
only true on average; there may well be a trade off in specific country circumstances.  If one is 
an absolutist, then an aggregate trade-off is implied by Figure 4: in a typical developing country, 
someone who values lower absolute inequality must be willing to have less growth and (as we 
will see below) higher absolute poverty.   
The distinction between absolute and relative inequality also has bearing on assessments 
of the prospects for reducing poverty through economic growth.  Naturally, what happens to 
inequality during the growth process is relevant to its impact on poverty.  A widely used 
benchmark for quantifying the impact of future growth on poverty is to assume that relative   26
inequality does not change.  For example, Chen and Ravallion (2004) show that for the 
developing world as a whole in 2001, the poverty gap index (for the “$1 per day” poverty line at 
1993 Purchasing Power Parity) has an elasticity with respect to the mean holding relative 
inequality constant of –2.3.  If all income levels grow at the same rate then the aggregate poverty 
gap index will fall at a rate of 4.6% per annum for a growth rate of 2% per annum in mean 
household income per capita.  What would happen if instead constant absolute inequality was 
taken as the distributional benchmark?  Repeating the Chen-Ravallion calculations but this time 
holding absolute inequality constant, I find that the elasticity rises sharply to –11.4.
26  So instead 
of the poverty gap falling at a rate of 4.6% per annum for a growth rate of 2% per annum, the 
same growth rate keeping absolute inequality constant would see the poverty gap falling at a 
remarkable 23% per annum. 
Of course, all such calculations are fanciful at best unless it can be established how one 
could achieve such a growth process in reality.  That is a moot point.  However, these simple 
calculations do at least serve to illustrate how sensitive our assessments of the impact on poverty 
of distribution-neutral growth can be to the concept of inequality we use in defining what 
“distribution-neutral” means.      
Economists specializing on income distribution are well aware of the distinction between 
absolute and relative inequality, though it is hardly ever mentioned in empirical work on growth 
and distribution.
 27  Contributions to the globalization debate, in both popular and academic 
forums, have rarely been explicit about which concept is being used.  Indeed, critics of 
                                                 
26   It is readily verified that elasticity of the poverty gap (PG) index with respect to the mean holding 
absolute inequality constant (call this 
A η ) is given by  z
R A / ) 1 ( µ η η − =  where  PG H
R / 1− = η   is 
the corresponding elasticity holding relative inequality constant, where H is the headcount index of 
poverty.   
27   An exception is Pritchett (1997).  Fields (2001) notes that absolute inequality exists as a concept, 
though he quickly moves on to focus solely on relative inequality.   27
globalization are often vague about what they mean by “inequality,” though what they have in 
mind appears to be closer to absolute inequality than relative inequality.  Defenders of 
globalization invariably point to evidence on relative inequality without mentioning that it is not 
the only possible concept of inequality and that the results obtained, and their interpretation for 
country policy, depend crucially on the choice. 
Yet the evaluative judgments drawn about the distributional changes associated with 
globalization may depend crucially on whether one thinks about inequality in absolute terms or 
relative terms.  There is no economic theory that tells us that inequality is relative, not absolute.  
It is not that one concept is right and one wrong.  Nor are they two ways of measuring the same 
thing.  Rather, they are two different concepts.  The revealed preferences for one concept over 
another reflect implicit value judgment about what constitutes a fair division of the gains from 
growth.
28  Those judgments need to be brought into the open and given critical scrutiny before 
one can take a well-considered position in this debate. 
   
Conclusions 
Both sides of the globalization debate often use the term “inequality” as though we all 
agree on exactly what that means.  But we almost certainly don’t all agree.  And that could well 
be the nub of the matter.  This paper has demonstrated that the factual claims one hears about 
what is happening to inequality in the world depend critically on value judgments embedded in 
standard measurement practices.  The paper has highlighted three such issues: whether one 
weights people equally or countries equally when assessing what is happening to global 
                                                 
28   In the theory of inequality measurement the issue is closely related to whether or not one accepts 
an axiom variously referred to as  “income homogeneity” or “scale independence.”   28
inequality, what weight one attaches to horizontal inequalities and whether one focuses on 
relative inequality or absolute inequality in assessing the welfare impacts of globalization.   
Forming defensible value judgments on each of these issues is hardly straightforward, 
and the paper has illustrated that arguments can be made both ways.  Readers should form their 
own judgments as to what side they take on each of these issues.  But this discussion points to 
some tentative conclusions. On the first issue, while it is simplistic to say that it is a purely 
technical “mistake” to not weight by population sizes, it can be agreed that there is something 
troubling about comparing inequality among countries ignoring the (huge) differences in their 
populations — thus giving higher weight to people living in smaller countries.  Whether 
population weights are the right approach is still unclear, given that country identity can matter 
to welfare.  Neither weighing method is ideal, but weighting countries equally would seem hard 
to defend when making normative judgments about inequality.   
On the second issue, while knowing what is happening to aggregate inequality and 
poverty is clearly of first-order importance, horizontal inequalities need to get more attention 
than they typically do in assessments of the welfare impacts of policy reforms.  Conventional 
inequality measures may well undervalue horizontal inequality.  In this respect, the globalization 
debate looks like a debate between two ships passing in the dark of night.  One side says that 
inequality has been unchanged in the aggregate and (hence) that poverty has fallen; the other side 
points to the losers amongst the poor.  Arguably both are right.   
On the third issue, both sides of the globalization debate need to be clearer about whether 
one is talking about absolute or relative inequality and to recognize that the other side may not 
share their concept.  Relative inequality has been the more prominent concept in applied work by 
economists, though arguably it is absolute inequality that most people see in the daily lives, and   29
that motivates their concerns about distributive justice.  Greater attention to absolute inequality 
would help inform important debates about development, including globalization.  However, the 
trade-offs with other valued goals, including fighting absolute poverty, need to be confronted 
explicitly.  
Contributions to the globalization debate — including both academic and popular 
contributions — have rarely acknowledged the differences in values that underlie the seemingly 
conflicting evidence on what has been happening to inequality and poverty.  Most readers of the 
popular press and the web sites reporting on this topic do not see the embedded value judgments 
in the “facts” presented to them.  It seems unlikely that most protagonists in this debate are 
deliberately duping the public; indeed, there appears to be some common ground of values, such 
as in the shared concern about absolute poverty.  Hopefully then the debate can move on to 
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Note: The figure gives the percentage of the population of low and middle-income countries estimated to 
living households with consumption or income per person less than $32.74 per month at 1993 Purchasing 
Power Parity.  
Source: Data from Chen and Ravallion (2004b).   32
Figure 3: Gini indices of GDP per capita across countries under alternative 
weighting schemes 
 
Source: Milanovic (2004) 
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